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CHAPTER 14 
Labor Relations 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§14.1. Federal law: Labor arbitration. The most discussed devel· 
opment in labor relations law during the 1960 SURVEY year was the 
handing down of three decisions on labor arbitration by the Supreme 
Court of the United States in June, 1960. In the American Manufac· 
turing casel the union brought an action in federal district court under 
Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947,2 to compel 
arbitration of a dispute over the employer's refusal to grant an em-
ployee's request to return to work following an absence due to an 
industrial accident. The company claimed that the employee was not 
physically able to do the work and, in any event, was estopped from 
claiming his job because he had settled his workmen's compensation 
claim on the basis that he was twenty-five per cent permanently, par-
tially disabled. The union's grievance, which the company refused to 
arbitrate, claimed the employee was entitled to return to his job under 
the seniority clause of the collective bargaining agreement. The fed-
eral district court and the court of appeals upheld the company on the 
basis that the grievance was "a frivolous patently baseless one, not sub-
ject to arbitration" under the agreement. The Supreme Court re-
versed. 
The collective bargaining agreement contained a usual type of griev-
ance procedure and provision for arbitration of any dispute "as to the 
meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of this agree-
ment." The seniority clause recognized seniority as a factor, when 
ability and efficiency were equal, in respect to layoff, re-employment, 
transfer, and promotion. The Supreme Court stated that the function 
of the courts is limited to ascertaining whether a claim is being asserted, 
whether frivolous or not, which "on its face" is governed by the con-
tract, and that it is not the business of the courts to weigh the merits of 
LAWRENCE M. KEARNS is a partner in the firm of Morgan, Brown, Kearns & Joy, 
Boston. He is co-author (with Donald A. Shaw) of Labor Relations Guide for Massa-
chusetts (1950 with 1957 Supp.). 
§14.1. 1 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 
U.S. 564, 80 Sup. Ct. 1343, 1363, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1403, 1432 (1960), rev'g 264 F.2d 624 
(6th Cir. 1959). 
229 U.S.C. §185 (1952). 
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the grievance. The Supreme Court specifically repudiated the New 
York "Cutler-Hammer doctrine," 3 which held frivolous claims not 
arbitrable on the theory that if the meaning of the contract provision 
is beyond dispute, there is nothing to arbitrate. 
The second Supreme Court decision was the Warrior Navigation 
Company case.4 There the union sought to arbitrate whether the 
company's contracting out of work, with a consequent reduction in the 
work force, constituted a partial lockout. The agreement contained a 
no-strike no-lockout clause and an arbitration clause that specifically 
stated that issues "which are strictly a function of management" were 
not arbitrable. The lower federal courts upheld management's con-
tention that contracting out work was strictly a function of manage-
ment and consequently not arbitrable under the agreement.5 Again, 
the Supreme Court reversed. In the view of the Supreme Court, the 
one who claims that the parties excluded from court determination, not 
only the decision on the merits of the grievance but also its arbitrability 
must bear the burden of clearly so demonstrating. Doubts are to be 
resolved in favor of coverage; "An order to arbitrate the particular 
grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive as-
surance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible to an interpreta-
tion that covers the asserted dispute." 6 
The third decision, handed down the same day as the other two, was 
the Enterprise case.7 Here the parties had gone to arbitration on the 
question of the discharge of a group of employees who had engaged 
in a walkout during the term of the collective bargaining agreement. 
The union took the case to arbitration several months after the agree-
ment had expired. The arbitrator found the discharges were not justi-
fied but the employees' improper conduct warranted ten days' suspen-
sion without pay. He ordered reinstatement with back pay except for 
the ten-day.renalty. 
The company refused to comply with the award. The federal dis-
trict court granted the union's request for an order to comply. The 
court of appeals, while upholding the arbitrator's decision on the merits 
and the award of back pay up to the date of contract expiration, held 
unenforcible the order of reinstatement and any back pay subsequent 
to the expiration of the agreement. The Supreme Court reversed the 
court of appeals on this point, thus sustaining the arbitrator's award of 
3 International Association of Machinists v. Cutler· Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 
917,67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1st Dept. 1947), afJ'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). 
4 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
80 Sup. Ct. 1347, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1409 (1960), rev'g 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir. 1959), 168 
F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ala. 1958). 
5 It appeared that the company had contracted out work for 19 years and the 
union had repeatedly and unsuccessfu1y sought to negotiate a contract provision to 
prevent contracting out. . 
6363 U.S. 574, 582·583, 80 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1353,4 L. Ed. 2d 1409, 1417 (1960). 
7 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593, 80 Sup. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed. 2d 1424 (1960). The lower courts' opinions are found 
in 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959). and 168 F. Supp. 308 (S.D.W. Va. 1958). 
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reinstatement and back pay.s The Supreme Court appears to say that 
the question whether wrongfully discharged employees could be rein-
stated after the agreement had expired and granted back pay up to the 
date reinstated is a question of interpretation of the agreement and 
therefore one for the arbitrator to determine. 
The language of the three opinions and the many sweeping state-
ments by way of dicta have caused much comment.9 Mr. Justice Doug-
las10 adopts the theory that labor arbitration is not an adjudicatory 
process comparable to commercial arbitration, but rather is a part of 
the continuing collective bargaining process - a system of industrial 
self-government - to which the arbitrator brings "his informed judg-
ment to bear in order to reach a fair solution of a problem." He also 
adopts the theory that the no-strike clause is the quid pro quo for the 
the arbitration clause,n and concludes that when there is an absolute 
no-strike clause "everything that management does is subject to the 
agreement" and all questions on which the parties disagree are arbi-
trable "apart from matters which the parties specifically exclude." An-
other view expressed by Mr. Justice Douglas is that the practices of the 
industry and the shop, referred to as "the industrial common law," are 
"a part of the collective bargaining agreement although not expressed 
in it" and are a "source of law" for labor arbitrators. The Court's 
opinion also states that an arbitrator needs flexibility in formulating 
remedies to meet a wide variety of situations. 
On the other hand, the Enterprise opinion contains this statement: 
Nevertheless, an arbitrator is confined to interpretation and ap-
plication of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit 
to dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course 
look for guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate 
only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining 
agreement.12 
The precise holdings in these cases can be rationalized on much nar-
rower grounds than the sweeping language in Mr. Justice Douglas' 
opinions. To what extent the broad dicta may become law when the 
8 The court of appeals had also held that the back pay award was unenforceable 
because it did not specifically determine the amount of back pay. The Supreme 
Court upheld this modification, thus sending the award back to the arbitrator for 
such determination. 
9 Professor Paul R. Hays of Columbia Law School, at the Annual Meeting of the 
A.B.A. Section of Labor Relations Laws, Washington, D.C., August 30, 1960, stated: 
"Perhaps it would be fair to say that the Court's view of labor arbitration, as ex-
pressed in these opinions, is romantic rather than realistic and rational." 
10 Mr. Justice Douglas wrote all three opinions of the Court. Mr. Justice Brennan 
wrote a concurring opinion in which Mr. Justice Harlan joined. Mr. Justice Frank-
furter concurred in the result. Mr. Justice Whittaker wrote dissenting opinions in 
Warrior and Enterprise but concurred in the result in American. Mr. Justice Black 
took no part in the decisions. 
11 Mr. Justice Brennan stated in his concurring opinion that he does not under-
stand the Court's decision to depend upon this theory. 
12363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 Sup. Ct. 1358,1361,4 L. Ed. 2d 1424, 1428 (1960). 
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Court is faced with considering them as specific issues for direct ruling 
in future cases is a matter of conjecture. Some believe these cases pres-
age a complete change in the approach to labor arbitration; others take 
the view that while there will undoubtedly be some change, particu-
larly in respect to the approach to arbitrability issues, it is not likely 
that the adjudicatory theory of labor arbitration will be abandoned in 
favor of the problem-solving approach when one or both parties oppose 
the latter approach. Arbitrators are likely to realize that awards that 
go far beyond the contemplation of either party and impinge upon 
important management or union rights may result in the parties pre-
ferring to leave to the economic pressures of a strike those issues that 
either considers nonarbitrable. 
In Masachusetts the problem of the court's role in the labor arbitra-
tion process is governed by the 1959 statute,13 an adaptation of the 
Uniform Arbitration Act. It is therein provided that the court may 
refuse to order arbitration, or stay a threatened arbitration if (1) there 
is no agreement to arbitrate or (2) the question for arbitration is not 
covered by the arbitration provision of the agreement and a dispute 
over the interpretation or application of the arbitration provision it-
self is not subject to arbitration under the agreement. It is further 
provided that an order to arbitrate shall not be denied, or a stay of 
arbitration granted "on the ground that the claim in issue lacks merit 
or bona fides or because no fault or grounds for the claim have been 
shown." A party may request the Superior Court to vacate the award 
for a number of reasons stated in the statute, including a claim that 
the arbitrator exceeded his powers or there was no arbitration agree-
ment, provided that the party raised this question of the arbitrability 
of the issue in the arbitration proceeding. There is a specific statutory 
provision to the effect that "the fact that the award orders reinstate-
ment of an employee with or without back payor grants relief such 
that it could not grant or would not be granted by a court of law or 
equity shall not be ground for vacating or refusing the award." 
The United States Supreme Court's labor arbitration decisions would 
appear to be applicable only to actions in the federal courts and hence 
would not be binding in cases arising in the courts of Massachusetts 
under the state statute.14 It seems probable that the result in the 
American ManUfacturing case would be the same under the Massachu-
setts statute but the precise issues in the other two cases, being much 
closer on the law and the facts, could well go either way, were they 
before a Massachusetts court under the new statute. So far as all the 
sweeping Supreme Court dicta are concerned, it is at least doubtful if 
13 G.L., c. 150C, added by Acts of 1959, c. 552. See 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§13.17. 
14 On the other hand, it may be argued that the new federal substantive law of 
labor arbitration is applicable to cases in state courts that could have been brought 
in federal court under Section 301 of the LMRA. See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, 
Congress and State Jurisdiction over Labor Relations, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 276-
281 (1959). The opinion is there indicated that there is concurrent state and fed. 
eral jurisdiction in labor arbitration cases. 
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they would be followed by the Massachusetts courts. While the Mas-
sachusetts statute recognizes the principle that the court's role in labor 
arbitration is limited, the judicial role is still an important one and 
the whole tenor of the Massachusetts labor arbitration statute is more 
in accord with the adjudicatory theory of arbitration15 than the 
collective bargaining, industrial self-government, or problem-solving 
theory adopted by Mr. Justice Douglas. 
§14.2. Massachusetts: Injunctions; Bethlehem and General Elec-
tric. Newspaper headlines publicized the denial of injunctive relief 
by the Superior Court in 1960 in the labor disputes at the Quincy Ship-
yard of Bethlehem Steel Company and the Lynn plant of General 
Electric Company. In both cases the companies sought injunctions 
against mass picketing and violence. In the Bethlehem case 1 the 
hearing before the three-judge court on the application for a tempo-
rary restraining order took seven court days. The court found that 
the conduct complained of was "lawless, unlawful and in some in-
stances criminal" and that all but one of the conditions precedent for 
granting equitable relief in labor disputes had been met.2 The one 
condition precedent that the court found had not been complied with 
and that was fatal to the company's case was Section 9A(4) of G.L., c. 
214, providing inter alia that the complainant must have made "every 
reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by negotiation or with 
the aid of any governmental machinery of mediation or voluntary arbi-
tration." 3 
The subsidiary findings were: (1) the company had failed to make 
every reasonable effort in good faith to settle the dispute by negotia-
tion because (a) it had posted unilaterally a notice, after the expiration 
of the collective bargaining agreement, putting into effect certain 
company proposals modifying previous conditions of employment and 
(b) the company's contract proposals would place it in a substantially 
15 In the light of Mr. Justice Douglas' assertion that the process of labor arbitra-
tion is vastly different in judicial theory from that of commercial arbitration, it is in-
teresting to compare the Massachusetts labor arbitration statute, G.L., c. 150C, 
added by Acts of 1959, c. 552, with the Uniform Arbitration Act for Commercial 
Disputes Act. enacted in Massachusetts in 1960 as G.L., c. 251, by Acts of 1960, c. 
374. Although there are some differences, the two acts are generally comparable 
both in substance and form. 
§14.2. 1 Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Robert J. Kehoe, Suffolk Superior Court, Equity 
No. 76496, Feb. 12, 1960. 
2 These conditions precedent are specified notice and hearing. filing of a bond and 
findings of unlawful action requiring restraint, substantial and irreparable injury. 
greater injury to complainant by denial of relief than upon defendants by granting 
it, no adequate remedy at law, and inability or unwillingness of the police to provide 
protection. 
3 Section 9A(4) of G.L., c. 214. reads in full as follows: "(4) No restraining order or 
injunctive relief shall be granted to any complainant who has failed to comply with 
any obligation imposed by law which is involved in the labor dispute in question, 
or who has failed to make every reasonable effort to settle such dispute either by 
negotiation or with the aid of any available governmental machinery of mediation 
or voluntary arbitration." 
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better competitive position than any other east coast shipbuilder; and 
(2) the company did not make every effort to settle the dispute with 
the aid of any governmental machinery for voluntary arbitration be-
cause it categorically rejected the union's proposal to arbitrate the 
dispute. In the course of its lengthy report the court also found that 
the company had refused to make any concessions with respect to its 
proposal for contract changes. 
Several weeks later the court issued a second report. This one 
related to the denial of a preliminary injunction. In this report it 
stated: 
At the hearing on the application for a restraining order we did 
not rule, and do not now rule that the refusal of the Bethlehem 
Steel Company to recede from any of its original proposals or to 
make any concessions or to compromise any of its proposals con-
stituted a failure to make every reasonable effort to settle the 
dispute by negotiation. . " We previously ruled, and we now 
again rule, that this requires negotiation in good faith and that 
failure so to negotiate bars the granting of injunctive relief. 
We did not rule at the previous hearing, and do not now rule, 
that Section 9A (4) requires a person seeking a restraining order 
or injunctive relief to submit the dispute to arbitration. We did 
rule, and now again rule, that the requirements of Section 9A (4) 
are additive and not alternative. The law, while not requiring a 
person seeking injunctive relief to submit the dispute to arbitra-
tion, does require such person to make every reasonable effort 
to settle the dispute with the aid of available governmental ma-
chinery for voluntary arbitration. This means, and we so rule, 
that such person must in good faith discuss, and consider the likeli-
hood of, settling the dispute by this means. The Bethlehem Steel 
Company categorically rejected the proposals of Locals 5, 90, and 
151 to arbitrate. We ruled previously, and now again rule, that 
the refusal of the Company to discuss, or to consider for discussion, 
any proposal for arbitration is fatal and bars injunctive relief in 
consequence of the provisions of Section 9A(4). 
In respect to whether negotiation, mediation, "or" arbitration are 
alternative or additive means that must be employed in an effort to 
settle the dispute, the court ruled they were additive, citing the Toledo 
case4 of the Supreme Court of the United States, which so held in 1940 
in construing identical language under the Norris-LaGuardia Act5 in a 
case involving a railroad subject to the Railway Labor Act.6 The Mas-
sachusetts three-judge court was of the opinion that the Toledo case 
was "controlling" and "we are bound by it." It also cited "significant 
intimations" in two decisions of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
4 Enterprise Lodge No. 27 v. Toledo, Peoria and Western R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 64 
Sup. Ct. 413, 88 L. Ed. 534 (1944). 
529 U.S.C. §§101-115 (1958). 
845 U.S.C. §§151-163 (1958). 
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Court, and the language added to the anti-injunction act in 1950 by 
the Cox-Phillips Act, to the effect that the act is to be construed "liber-
ally in aid of its purpose which is to limit and curtail the use of injunc-
tions in labor disputes." 
The Bethlehem strike was settled while an appeal to the Supreme 
Judicial Court was pending and the appeal was dismissed as moot.7 
In the General Electric case,s a different three-judge court also found 
that Section 9A(4) had not been complied with. The court based its 
conclusion on these findings: (I) The company failed to make every 
reasonable effort to settle the labor dispute with the aid of federal me-
diation because the mediators did not appear on the scene until ten 
days before the contract expiration date and there was no fair oppor-
tunity for them to advance a settlement, and the proposal of the federal 
mediators for using a panel of mediators was rejected by the company; 
(2) the company violated its duty to bargain with the international 
union as required by the National Labor Relations Act by dealing with 
business agent Jandreau of the Schenectady local, thus bypassing the 
international negotiating committee and, therefore, failed to comply 
with an obligation imposed by law; (3) there was no sufficient reason 
for the company's refusal to accept the union's proposal for a fifteen-day 
extension of the agreement; (4) there was no sufficient reason for the 
company's refusal to accept the offer of the union that the issues be 
settled by submission to either (a) a fact-finding board for nonbinding 
recommendations or (b) to binding arbitration. The court found that 
the company's decision was attributable to its position that neither 
fact-finding nor voluntary arbitration is a useful procedure to employ 
in an effort to settle a labor-management dispute. 
Here, unlike the situation in Bethlehem, General Electric did not 
immediately reject the union's proposal for fact-finding or arbitration 
but replied in writing setting forth in detail a statement of reasons for 
rejecting this proposal. The three-judge court states: "1£ the Company 
had accepted the IUE proposals [for fact-finding or arbitration] there 
would have been no strike on October I." It would seem, therefore, 
that the three-judge court in General Electric went further than the 
three-judge court in Bethlehem, since it places noncompliance with 
7 In an action brought by the NLRB under Section lOG) of the NLRA, the Federal 
District Court for Massachusetts enjoined the unions from mass picketing and vio-
lence as constituting unfair labor practices under Section 8(b)(I) of that act and 
also ordered Bethlehem to bargain in good faith. Alpert v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 
Fed. Dist. Ct., Dist. Mass., Civil No. 6O·217·S, April II, 1960. Proceedings under 
Section lOG) for equitable relief pending the board's hearing are discretionary with 
the board and are rarely instituted. An NLRB trial examiner, after hearing, has 
recommended rejection of all bad·faith bargaining charges against Bethlehem except 
for its insistence on a contract provision requiring grievances be signed by the indio 
vidual employees involved. (Case No. 2·CA·6866 and 6867, 95 D.L.R. D·I, May 16, 
1960). Another trial examiner upheld the mass picketing and violence charges 
against the unions (Cases Nos. I·CB·635 and 636, August 23, 1960) and that case is 
also pending before the board. 
S General Electric Co. v. Thomas B. McQueeney, Suffolk Superior Court, Equity 
No. 77426, October 21, 1960. 
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Section 9A(4) on nonacceptance of the union's proposals for fact-finding 
and arbitration rather than on the narrower grounds of "categorical" 
rejection without consideration or reasons, which appeared to be the 
interpretation in the second Bethlehem report. 
The General Electric strike ended shortly after the three-judge 
court's decision and no appeal was taken. 
The conclusion of the three judges in Bethlehem that the Toledo 
case was controlling and binding would appear open to serious ques-
tion. The construction of a state statute is a matter for the courts of 
the state.9 Although a decision by the highest federal court construing 
identical language in a federal statute is obviously persuasive, it still 
would not prevent the state court from adopting a different construc-
tion.10 
Section 9A(4) has been on the statute books since 1935 and these 
cases are the first in which this section has been the controlling issue. 
There is no direct holding by the Supreme Judicial Court and the 
"significant intimations" referred to are arguable. 
Those supporting these decisions argue that Section 9A(4) is an 
adaptation of the equitable doctrine of clean hands. Those opposed 
argue that the obligation of an employer in interstate commerce to bar-
gain collectively in good faith is determined by the National Labor 
Relations Board, and the employer should not be compelled to arbi-
trate the merits of the labor dispute as a condition precedent to obtain-
ing relief against such lawless conduct as mass picketing and violence. 
Apart from the important question of public policy as to whether, 
if these decisions have correctly interpreted and applied the law, it is 
a sound, wise and desirable state for the law to be in, one observation 
may fairly be made. A chief argument of proponents of anti-injunction 
laws was that judges were deciding whether union conduct should be 
enjoined as unlawful on the basis of their economic predilections or 
whether there was "justification" for the union's objective - a broad 
and vague concept.ll In the Bethlehem and General Electric cases the 
result would appear to turn on the hindsight opinion of judges as to 
whether a company's conduct in its dealings with the union during the 
labor dispute measure up to the judges' concept of what constitutes 
"reasonable efforts to settle" the labor dispute - certainly a mercurial 
criterion reasonably comparable to the flexibility of the "justification" 
concept. Employers' criticism of the present situation is, in this re-
spect, comparable to the unions' criticism of quite the opposite situa-
tion in an earlier day. 
§14.3. Massachusetts: Picketing for closed shop; Unlawful objec-
tive. An intriguing question of legal theory is presented by Seekonk 
9 See 50 Am. Jur., Statutes §323 (1944). 
10 Compare, for example, Colonial Press, Inc. v. Ellis, 321 Mass. 495, 74 N.E.2d I, 
20 L.R.R.M. 2310 (1947), in which the Supreme Judicial Court declined to accept at 
face value the United States Supreme Court's earlier statements that peaceful picket-
ing was constitutionally protected free speech, a doctrine subsequently modified by 
the latter Court. 
11 Frankfurter and Green, The Labor Injunction (1930). 
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Family Drive-in Theatre, Inc. v. Madino.1 Can an employer not sub-
ject to the National Labor Relations Act commit an unfair labor prac-
tice in violation of that act? Although this question is basic to the 
opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court in this case, and the Court's 
answer apears to be in the affirmative, the question is not discussed by 
the Court. 
The facts in the case were that the union peacefully picketed an 
open-air moving picture theatre to compel the company to maintain a 
closed shop, that is, to hire only members of the union as projection-
ists. The projectionists employed by the company were not members 
of the union. The union's picket signs read: "This theatre does not 
employ union moving picture machine operators of Local 223 IA TSE, 
AFL-CIO." 
The Court held that the union's demand for a closed shop was for 
an unlawful objective and that the picketing in support of that objec-
tive was unlawful and may be enjoined.2 Section 20C(e) of G.L., c. 149, 
provides, in part, that the term "unlawful labor dispute" includes any 
controversy arising out of a demand "that an employer commit an 
unfair labor practice either in violation of Chapter 150A, or in viola-
tion of the National Labor Relations Act." The reasoning of the 
Court's opinion is that a closed shop violates the National Labor Re-
lations Act. 
The opinion does not state whether the company was subject to the 
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. It seems obvious 
that it was not, and, in any event, the doctrine of federal pre-emption 
would seem clearly to preclude equitable relief in the state court if the 
National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction.s The Court cor-
rectly concluded that a closed shop violates the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,· but failed to note that the Massachusetts Labor Relations 
Act5 permits a closed shop under certain conditions and with specific 
statutory remedies designed to alleviate abuses when there is a closed 
§14.3. 1340 Mass. 425,164 N.E.2d 880 (1960). 
2 The Superior Court had entered a final decree permanently enjoining the union 
from picketing, on the basis of a master's report. Neither the master nor the Supe-
rior Court made all the findings required by C.L., c. 214, §9A, in labor cases. For 
this reason, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed and remanded the case for further 
hearing by a three-judge court. The Court thus followed Poirer v. Superior Court, 
337 Mass. 522, 150 N.E.2d 558 (1958), which held that the required findings must be 
made regardless of whether the labor dispute is lawful or unlawful. See 1958 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law §15.2. 
3 Carner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs Be Helpers Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 
74 Sup. Ct. 161,98 L. Ed. 228(1953), and subsequent decisions. See 1959 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §13.9; 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.l; 1957 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §25.l; 
1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.2; 1955 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.l; 1954 Ann. Surv. 
Mass. Law §16.2. 
4 Section 8(a)(3) of the N.L.R.A., as amended by Taft-Hartley, permits a form 
of union shop (requiring present employees or new employees to join the union 
in thirty days) limited, however, to maintenance of financial good standing in the 
union. A closed shop requires that all employees, including those being hired, be 
union members. 
Ii C.L., c. 150A. 
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union as well as a closed shop, or when the union engages in arbitrary 
action to deprive individuals of union membership.6 One of the con-
ditions for a valid closed shop agreement under the Massachusetts stat-
ute is that the union be designated as bargaining agent by a majority 
of the employees in the appropriate unit.7 In the Seekonk case, it ap-
pears that the union was not the majority representative and, hence, 
the company would have committed an unfair labor practice under the 
Massachusetts Labor Relations Act had it granted the union's demand, 
which was found to be the object of the picketing. It would seem that 
the case could have been decided on this basis, thus avoiding the doubt-
ful reasoning that an employer not subject to the federal act can still 
be said to be forced to commit an unfair labor practice in violation of 
that act. The latter reasoning could well have many ramifications.8 
§14.4. Massachusetts: Reporting of health and welfare funds. 
As noted in the 1959 ANNUAL SURVEy,l several cases were then pending 
that involved the scope of the Health, Welfare and Retirement Funds 
Law.2 In the 1960 SURVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court resolved 
the issue in two companion cases.s It held that the statute does not 
6 Id. §§4(3), 4(6), 6A·6C. 
7 Id. §4(3). 
81f a union were the majority representative of the employees in an appropriate 
unit and the company were not subject to the NLRA, it would be lawful for the 
union and the employer to enter into a closed shop agreement under G.L., c. 150A, 
§4(3). Yet if such a union strikes or pickets for a closed shop, lawful under state 
law, the reasoning of the Seekonk case would make the strike and picketing un-
lawful. This was the state of the Massachusetts law prior to the enactment of 
the 1950 amendments to the statute, commonly referred to as the Cox.Phillips Act. 
Acts of 1950, c. 452. Most observers thought ,that one of the results of the 1950 
amendments was to make lawful a strike and picketing for a demand tpat, if 
granted, would be a lawful agreement. The reason §20C(e)(I) of G.L., c. 149, 
referred to an unlawful labor dispute as including a demand that an employer 
commit an unfair labor practice "in violation of the National Labor Relations Act" 
as well as the State Labor Relations Act, appears to be that in 1950 the prevailing 
opinion was that state courts had jurisdiction to enjoin unlawful conduct by unions 
against companies ~at were subject to federal jurisdiction. It was not until the 
Garner case, in 1953, that the Supreme Court of the United States enunciated its 
doctrine of federal pre-emption. Compare Shaw and Kearns, Labor Relations 
Guide for Massachusetts 87 (1950), with 1954 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.1. 
One of the possible effects of the reasoning in Seekonk is that a union's strike 
or picketing to obtain a hot cargo agreement from an intrastate company would be 
unlawful. See Section 8(e) of the NLRA, as amended by the Labor Reform Act. 
§14.4. 1 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §13.6, n.ll. 
2 G.L., c. 15lD. 
S Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Health, Welfare and Retirement Trust Funds Board, 
1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 901, 167 N.E.2d 855; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. 
Health, Welfare and Retirement Trust Funds Board, 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 913, 167 
N.E.2d863. 
In the Liberty Mutual case, another carrier had issued a group life insurance 
policy to Liberty covering Liberty'S employees. Liberty paid the entire premium 
for certain basic coverage and handled additional voluntary coverage by those em-
ployees desiring it on the basis of payroll deductions. The company paid the 
entire annual premium in advance, with adjustments at the end of the year. 
In the John Hancock case, the plan involved was an insured pension plan han-
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cover group insurance programs or other welfare plans "which do not 
include the creation of a trust fund in the usual sense." The regula-
tion of the Health, Welfare and Retirement Trust Fund Board, which 
defined a "trust" to include a "fund, plan, program or contract . . . 
whether or not separately identified or segregated in any way as in-
volving a corpus or was in the usual sense," was ruled invalid. 
§14.5. Massachusetts: Employment security. During the 1960 
SURVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court handed down three decisions 
involving the Employment Security Law.! In Western Electric Com-
pany, Inc. v. Director of the Division of Employment Security,2 the 
granting of benefits to female employees for whom work was unavail-
able upon their seeking re-employment following maternity leave, was 
upheld.s 
In Conley v. Director of the Division of Employment Security4 the 
Court upheld a decision of the Board of Review sustaining the denial 
of benefits to an individual who was found to have made "little effort 
to secure work." The division was held to have been justified in con-
cluding that only six applications for work in a five-month period of 
unemployment was not sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements 
that to be eligible for benefits, the unemployed person must be "capable 
of and available for work and unable to obtain work in his usual oc-
cupation or any other occupation for which he is reasonably fitted." 5 
The Court stated: 
Whether an unemployed person is unable to obtain work, or is 
otherwise eligible for benefits, is largely a question of fact, as to 
which the burden rests on the unemployed person to show that 
his continued unemployment is not due to his own lack of dili-
gence.6 
An interesting labor relations problem existed in Meyers v. Director 
of the Division of Employment Security.7 Employee A was laid off for 
dIed by Hancock and covering the employees of Forbes Lithograph Company. The 
fact that there was on the books of the insurance company an account entitled 
"Pension Administration Fund" was held not to make it a trust fund within the 
statutory meaning as interpreted by the Court. 
§14.5. 1 G.L., c. 151A. 
2340 Mass. 190, 163 N .E.2d 154 (1960). 
3 The case arose under Section 25(e) of G.L., c. 151A, which, at the time the claim 
was filed, disqualified an employee from receiving benefits after he had "left his 
work without good cause attributable to the employing unit or its agent." This 
provision was changed in 1958 both as to the period of disqualification and, so far 
as leaving work is concerned, to cases where the individual "left work voluntarily 
without good cause." Acts of 1958, c. 677, noted in 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass Law 
§15.3. It may be noted that Section 27 of G.L., c. 151A, contains a special dis-
qualification in the case of unempolyment because of pregnancy and for the period 
following the birth of the child. 
4340 Mass. 315,164 N.E.2d 330 (1960). 
5 G.L., c. 151A, §24. 
6340 Mass. 315, 319, 164 N .E.2d 330, 333 (1960). 
71960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 751,167 N.E.2d 160. 
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lack of work. The union contended that the company had violated 
the collective bargaining agreement because A was senior to employee 
B, who was not laid off. This dispute was submitted to arbitration and 
the arbitrator upheld the union's contention. The award provided 
that employee A should be made whole for wages lost while laid off 
"less any amount he may have received from unemployment compensa-
tion during that period." His lost wages totaled approximately $1400; 
he had received approximately $600 in unemployment benefits and, 
therefore, was entitled to $800 under the award. 
After this arbitration award, the division issued a notice of redeter-
mination and overpayment to employee A, who appealed. A review 
examiner and the lower court both affirmed. The Supreme Judicial 
Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. The net result is that 
the employee will be required to pay back to the division the $600 he 
had received in benefits, leaving him with the $800 received from the 
company although his lost wages were $1400. Whether he may have 
any remedy under the arbitration award is problematica1.8 
The Court stated the question before it was whether the employee 
had been in "total unemployment," within the statutory meaning of 
that phrase, during the period in dispute. Under the statute, an in-
dividual is deemed in total unemployment in any week "in which he 
performs no wage-earning service whatever and for which he receives 
no remuneration." 9 The Court held that the back pay awarded by 
the arbitrator was remuneration from the employer for wages during 
the period involved. The fact that the arbitrator deducted the amount 
of unemployment benefits from his award was immaterial since the 
award was not binding on the division or the courts. Citing a decision 
of the Supreme Court of the United States,lO the Court pointed out that 
the matter of recoupment by the state for unemployment benefits is a 
matter between the state and the employee. 
§14.6. Massachusetts: Miscellaneous decisions. Several cases dur-
ing the 1960 SURVEY year involved contracts of employment. The opin-
ion in Rhine v. International Young Men's Christian Association Col-
8 The Court stated in its opinion: "We do not have before us the issue whether, 
in view of our decision, [employee A] is entitled to further payment of wages under 
the arbitration award." Presumably it could be argued that the award still stands 
since an arbitrator's mistakes of law are not judicially correctible. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that in carrying out the award the company may not 
deduct the unemployment benefits from the amount of back pay because after the 
employee has paid them back to the state he is no longer in receipt of any statutory 
benefits. Apart from the doubtful question whether any provision of the new labor 
arbitration statute would apply as to correction or modification of the award in 
these circumstances, it is obvious that the time limits for pursuing any remedies 
under that statute would have expired. As a matter of interest, it may be noted 
that in a situation such as this, the unemployment benefit fund benefits, since 
if employee B had been laid off instead of A, as the arbitrator decided, B would 
have been entitled to unemployment benefits. 
9 See C.L., c. 151A, §§29(a), §! (r)(2)-(3). 
10 NLRB v. Cullet Cin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 71 Sup. Ct. 337, 95 L. Ed. 337 (1951). 
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lege! contains a definition of probationary status.2 In this case, the 
employee would have had certain rights to continued employment had 
he completed his probationary period. Before the end of that period 
the employer offered him a specific period of employment after such 
probationary period with no commitment beyond the expiration of 
such new period. The employee accepted. It was held there was no 
breach of contract in refusing the employee continued employment 
after the expiration of the specific period of employment following 
the probationary period. 
In another case,s involving employment by a municipality, accept-
ance of a promotion was held not to amount to a "resignation" from 
the job from which promoted, and, therefore, the employee was not 
entitled to pay for such position for the balance of the year, although 
he would have been so entitled under his employment conditions had 
it been a resignation. The Court noted that the rule of Donlan v. City 
of Boston4 in respect to annual employment was not squarely involved 
and "[w]e need not decide whether the Donlan case would now be fol-
lowed." Ii 
As noted later in this chapter,6 the Supreme Judicial Court construed 
the weekly payment of wage statute as creating an obligation of fre-
quency, as well as promptness, in the payment of wages and held that 
it was unlawful to pay employees every other Wednesday for services 
performed for the preceding four working days (Thursday, Friday, 
Monday, and Tuesday) and for services to be performed on that 
Wednesday and the next six working days.7 The subsequent amend-
ment to the statute has now made such a pay arrangement lawfu1.8 
There was one decision during the 1960 SURVEY year involving the 
Minimum Fair Wage Law, but it is of academic interest only because 
of a subsequent amendment to the statute.9 Of collateral interest to 
§14.6. 1339 Mass. 610, 162 N.E.2d 56 (1959), also noted in §4.2 supra. 
2 "In ordinary connotation, the word [probationary] indicates a status of experi. 
mental testing of the employee. It certainly implies no commitment for continuance 
of employment, if for any reason the experimental relationship leads to the con· 
clusion that a more extended relationship may be unsatisfactory." 339 Mass. at 
613, 162 N.E.2d at 59. 
S Ohrenberger v. City of Boston, 340 Mass. 22, 162 N.E.2d 774 (1959), also noted 
in §4.l supra. 
4223 Mass. 285, III N.E. 718 (1916). 
Ii The Donlan case held that where annual employment is at a fixed annual salary 
payable in monthly instalments, and the employee died during vacation and at 
the end of the eleventh month, the estate was not entitled to the twelfth month's 
pay because the employee had received full compensation for services up to the 
date of death and the employment contract, which was entire, was terminated by 
death. The Court noted that its decision in Donlan had been criticized. 
6 See §14.9 infra. 
7 American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of Labor and Indus· 
tries, 340 Mass. 144, 163 N.E.2d 19 (1959). 
8 See §14.9 infra. 
9 Robinson v. Pine Grove Cemetery Corp., 339 Mass 729, 162 N.E.2d 16 (1959). 
The case held that in an action of contract for work and labor performed between 
13
Kearns: Chapter 14: Labor Relations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1960
,. 
164 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §14.7 
labor relations practitioners is a tax decision holding that old age bene-
fits received under the federal Social Security Act are not taxable as 
retirement income under Massachusetts income tax law.10 
B. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§14.7. Collective bargaining: Public employees. The trend to-
ward extending the right of organization and collective bargaining to 
public employees in Massachusetts continues. The legislature has now 
specifically provided that a city or town, on the basis of local option, 
"may engage in collective bargaining with labor organizations repre-
senting its employees, except police officers, and may enter into collec-
tive bargaining agreements with such organizations." 1 A 1958 statute2 
recognized the right of public employees to form and join unions and 
"to present proposals" relative to their salaries and conditions of em-
ployment. 
There are still unresolved problems in this area. There is no method 
for determining a question of whether the union represents the em-
ployees if there is doubt or if more than one union claims to represent 
them. The private employee concept of a majority representative be-
ing exclusive bargaining agent for all employees in an appropriate 
unit, although some employees in the unit may not be members of the 
union, does not apply to public employees in Massachusetts under these 
statutes.a Presumably, therefore, the collective bargaining agreements 
for public employees, now permitted, would cover only those employees 
who are union members since they would be the only ones the union 
would be representing and the statute authorizes collective bargaining 
with unions "representing its [the city's or town's] employees." 
§14.8. Attachment of wages. The statutory provisions relating to 
the attachment of wages have been amended to permit this attachment 
only in an action brought upon a judgment.1 The statutory require-
ment for advance, written permission signed by a justice of the court 
in which the action is commenced, after notice to the defendant with 
May, 1947, and February, 1950, based on failure to pay the minimum required by 
G.L., c. 151, it was error for the trial court to have denied the defendant's request 
for a ruling that there was no minimum wage in effect under G.L., c. 151, covering 
the wages of the plaintiff prior to January I, 1950. Prior to that date the minimum 
fair wage was only that rate set forth in minimum wage orders applicable to par-
ticular occupations. Since January I, 1950, there has been a minimum fair wage 
applicable generally (with a few exceptions) both to occupations covered by wage 
orders and those not so covered. 
10 State Tax Commissioner v. Gray, 340 Mass. 535,165 N.E.2d 404 (1960). 
§14.7. 1 Acts of 1960, c. 561. 
2 Acts of 1958, c. 677. See 1958 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.4. 
a The view has been expressed that it would be contrary to public policy to per-
mit recognition of a union designated by a majority of governmental employees in 
a given unit as the exclusive representative of all employees in such unit. Teller, 
A Labor Policy for America, 276-277 (1945). 
§14.8. 1 Acts of 1960, c. 235. 
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opportunity to be heard if he objects, remains unchanged.2 The spe-
cial provision granting discretion to a justice to authorize the attach-
ment without notice when he finds that compliance with the provisions 
will unreasonably delay and hamper justice is also unchanged.3 The 
present amount of wages exempt from attachment is $50 per week.4 
14.9. Weekly payment of wages. As a result of a decision of the 
Supreme Judicial Court! to the effect that it was a violation of the 
statute requiring weekly payment of wages to pay less frequently than 
weekly, although part of the wages might be paid in advance of the 
time required, the statute has been amended2 to permit this type of 
arrangement, which has been a prevalent practice among certain groups 
of office and clerical employees, particularly in the insurance and bank-
ing industries. The amendment provides that an employer may make 
payment of wages prior to the time they are required to be paid under 
the provisions of the statute, and these wages, together with any wages 
already earned and due, may be paid weekly, biweekly, or semimonthly 
to a salaried employee but in no event shall wages remain unpaid by 
an employer for more than six days from the termination of the work 
week in which such wages were earned by the employee. This permits, 
for example, the payment of two weeks' salary on Thursday of a cur-
rent work week, covering services performed in the preceding work 
week and the current work week, when the employee is on a Monday 
through Friday work week. 
§14.10. Miscellaneous legislation. The 1959 session of the legisla-
ture ended on September 17, 1959, shortly after the close of the 1959 
SURVEY year, and the 1959 ANNUAL SURVEY covered the full session.! 
On September I, 1960, the end of the 1960 SURVEY year, the legislature 
was still in session and a number of important labor bills were stit! 
pending as of that date.2 An act was passed during the 1960 SURVEY 
2 G.L., c. 246, §32. 
3 Ibid. 
4 G.L., c. 246, §28, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 187. 
§14.9. 1 American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Commissioner of Labor 
and Industries, 340 Mass. 144, 163 N.E.2d 19 (1959), noted in §14.6 supra. 
2 Acts of 1960, c. 416. 
§14.l0. lOne act signed the day the 1959 legislature ended, Acts of 1959, c. 614, 
while of limited application, is highly unusual and would be a significant develop-
ment if there should be any legislative disposition to extend this type of enactment 
to other situations. Entitled" An Act Establishing Safety Orders Applicable To 
Longshore And Waterfront Operations," it is a lengthy and extremely detailed code 
governing facilities, equipment, and conduct (of both employer and employee) re-
lated to health and safety. In language and form the act is similar to regulations 
of the Department of Labor and Industries. A fine of $200 is provided for any 
violation. It is questionable whether legal requirements of the nature provided by 
this act should be enacted in statutory form or left to the administrative process 
of regulations issued and enforced by the Department of Labor and Industries. 
2 A number of these were subsequently enacted and will be commented on in the 
1961 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law. They are Acts of 1960, c. 738 (registration of labor 
replacements or strike breakers); id., c. 802 (further regulating the business of pri-
vate detectives and guard agencies); id., c. 812 (extension of Sunday laws to certain 
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year requiring employers to indicate deductions for health and welfare 
funds on pay checks or pay slips of employees when requested by the 
employee or his representative.3 In addition to this act and those noted 
in the preceding three sections of this chapter, up to September I, 1960, 
the legislature had passed the perennial act authorizing the Commis-
sioner of Labor and Industries to suspend the operation of certain 
labor laws for another year, namely, until July 1, 1961,4 and a few other 
acts in the labor relations field that amended existing statutes and are 
not of major significance.5 
legal holidays); id., c. 812 (amending the minimum wage law to provide time and 
one-half for hours worked in excess of forty hours in a work week). 
3 Id., c. 246. 
4 Id., c. 85. 
5 Id., c. 401 (providing that payments to pension plans shall be included for the 
purpose of establishing minimum wage rates applicable to public works); id., c. 491 
(providing that wages paid to certain employees of housing authorities are to be 
determined by the Commissioner of Labor and Industries); id., c. 603 (clarifying 
change of language in the provision of the Employment Security Law, G.L., c. ISlA, 
§29(c), relating to the total amount of unemployment benefits payable to an indi-
vidual under that law). 
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